For those of us who have not had enough of Gulen, here is a paper written by Bayram Balci

Religion, State & Society, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2003
ISSN 0963-7494 print/ISSN 1465-3975 online/03/020151-27 ! 2003 Keston Institute
DOI: 10.1080/0963749032000074006

Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia
and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam1

BAYRAM BALCI

Introduction: The Nurcu Movement from Said Nursi to Fethullah Gülen
The Legacy of Said Nursi

A broad outline of Said Nursi’s life and thought is crucial to an understanding of the
Gülen phenomenon in Central Asia. Born in 1873 in the village of Nurs (southeastern
Turkey), Said Nursi was deeply influenced by the classical teaching in
the madrassah and the traditional and conservative atmosphere of his region. His
biographies and hagiographies highlight three essential periods in his career.2
Between 1873 and 1925 he first got involved in politics and religious matters,
fighting for the rooting of Islam in the state institutions of the dying Ottoman Empire,
dreaming of an Islamic university as prestigious as Al-Azhar, heroically leading a
movement of popular resistance in the First World War against the Russian troops,
who held him as a prisoner of war in Siberia until 1916, negotiating in vain the role he
felt Islam must play in the emerging modern Turkey of the young Mustafa Kemal.
Distrusted and disappointed by Turkey’s new secular leaders, Nursi returned home to
teach Islam. When in 1925 a separatist Kurdish revolt broke out in the south-east, he
opposed it publicly, but he was still deported to the West by the young Kemalist
regime, which was eager to pacify the region and eliminate all possible opposition.
From his deportation to approximately the beginning of 1950s Said Nursi remained
far from politics, dedicating his time to writing and sharing his ideas with newly
converted disciples and followers. Considered as dangerous for the stability of the
state, he was arrested and imprisoned for 11 years (1935–46). Most of his essays were
written in prison, where he converted his first followers and where his thought
evolved from the goal of Islamisation of the state towards the even more essential
Islamisation of the spirit and the reinforcement of faith by education.

Nursi’s followers were known as Nur Talebeleri, ‘the Followers of Nur’, ‘nur’
meaning ‘light’ in Turkish as well as recalling Nursi’s name and village of origin.
They constituted what became known as the Nurcu Movement.
As political pluralism in Turkey made progress between 1946 and 1950 and new
political parties emerged, the hitherto unique Republican Party of the People
(Cumhurieyt Halk Partisi, CHP) was now challenged by the Democratic Party
(Demokrat Partisi, DP) of Adnan Menderes. This major political change brought a
change for Said Nursi too. Although the leader of the Nur Talebeleri invited people to
support the DP because it tolerated religious activities in Turkey, Nursi, until his
death in 1960 and the banning of his ideas and publications after the military coup,
continued to denounce the ‘politicisation’ of religion, calling on his followers not to
get involved with any party or political movement but to concentrate on Islam only.

Said Nursi’s Thought

Many books have been devoted to the religious ideas of Said Nursi and their impact
in Turkey. Faith is at the very centre of Nursi’s thought. He gives priority to the
reinforcement of individual faith, and only after that to the revival of faith in society.
In his view this great ideal can be accomplished only through education, and this
comes to play a major role in his vision of the development of Islam in the context of
modernity.

‘Modernity’ is indeed the other key concept in Nursi’s understanding of Islamic
revival. It has two different but complementary aspects. The first aspect is technology,
and especially telecommunications and the media, as a tool for disseminating
his ideas widely and attracting the younger generation. The second aspect is the
introduction of science. Very early, Nursi advocated the modernisation of the
classical spirit of the madrassah by the introduction of mathematics, physics and logic
into the educational curriculum. The objective was to demonstrate that Islam
belonged to the present and the future just as much as science and modernity did.
The Relationship of Fethullah Gülen to Said Nursi

After the death of Said Nursi his followers divided. Various subcommunities emerged
in the 1960s and 1970s for a variety of reasons: political (support for the army or a
political party), religious (contacts with the religious political parties), ethnic (the
Kurdish question and the interpretation of Nursi’s message) and generational. Among
these subgroups and among the Nurcu leaders claiming Nursi’s legacy, Fethullah
Gülen stands apart.

Although both men originated from eastern Turkey, Gülen, born in 1938 near
Erzurum, never met Nursi; but he was deeply influenced by his ideas.
The major common points linking them are the importance given to education and
the anchorage of Islam in modernity. Since the beginning of his religious career
Gülen has been putting into practice Nursi’s conception of education as a method
of strengthening faith. Like Nursi’s, Gülen’s conception of education involves a
scientific input and openness to modernity, making real Nursi’s dream of a mix of
madrassah (the classical Islamic school system) and mektep (the modern school
system), simultaneously developing secular and religious subjects in the same
curriculum. Last but not least, both thinkers place Islam in good harmony with
modernity, enlarging the debate on Islam’s compatibility with democracy and the
western world (Gülen, 2001).

At the start of the 1970s Gülen was an employee of the state, working as a vaiz
(preacher) in the mosque of Kestanepazari, near Izmir. Aware of the importance of
education for the development of Islamic faith in the country, he gathered a small
group of followers in vakif (private foundations) and organised ‘religious summer
schools’, which could be compared to scout camps, and where hundreds of students
received Islamic education.

During the 1970s new vakif were created throughout the country. The media
network was developed in order to increase the community’s influence. Conscious of
his fragile status in the secular republic, Gülen never attacked the state and its secular
institutions, but he proved to have a strong nationalist dimension in his ideology.
The 1980s saw the fast development of the movement, eased by liberal measures
introduced by the government in the 1980s that transformed the economy and society.
Economic development was boosted and the various political, social and religious
organisations strengthened their influence. The vakif belonging to Gülen’s community
invested in all economic sectors but especially in education with the creation
of private schools, dormitories and dershane (special schools where students prepare
for examinations for entry to university). Nurcu media like the magazine Sızıntı, the
newspaper Zaman and the television station Samanyolu were developed. After the
military coup of 1980 open religious activities increased. Because of the ‘communist
threat’ and the feared influence of leftist organisations in Turkey the military regime
tolerated the development of Islamic consciousness among young people and sometimes
facilitated the development of Islamism. By the end of the 1980s the community
of Fethullah Gülen became the most powerful Islamic organisation in Turkey,
with the exception of the various political parties created by Necmettin Erbakan, the
Islamism of which is more political than cultural. The collapse of the socialist bloc
in the 1990s proved to be an even better opportunity for the development of the
community in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Nurcu Movement in Central Asia Today

The purpose of this article is not to study Gülen’s community in Turkey; this has
already been the subject of good research.3 Since the beginning of the 1990s Central
Asia has been the area where this movement has mainly been focusing its strategy of
development as a transnational network. It is important therefore to analyse in detail
the role of this community’s presence in Central Asia in order to understand the
nature of this neo-Nurcu movement. Because of its strong presence in Central Asia,
Gülen’s movement is an element in the development of Ankara’s policies in the
Turkic republics there. The neo-Nurcu presence in Central Asia is everywhere: in
economic life, in the media and in the educational network. In this study I shall try to
analyse the ideology of the Nurcu movement and its ambitions for this area. The first
aim of Gülen’s students (shagird) is of course to reintroduce Islam into an area
that has for so long been dominated by atheism and communism. As I am going to
demonstrate, however, this group – called cemaat, which means ‘community’ – faces
difficulties in trying to propagate its ideas in the Central Asian republics. This is
partly due to the Central Asian states’ attitude and partly to the nature of the movement’s
ideas. Turkism is much more easily spread than Islam. High schools – liseler –
are the most important of the community’s establishments in Central Asia.

This study is based on field research carried out between November 1996 and May
2002 in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, and on work in
Turkey.4 In the course of my research I had the opportunity to interview hundreds of
people, most of them employed in these Turkish private schools or working with
them.5 I also had the opportunity to live with teachers in these schools. I interviewed
people in the following categories:
" the manager of all the schools in each republic (genel müdür)
" the heads of each subject in the school (zümre bas,kanları)
" the teachers and tutors (ög˘retmen and belletmen)
" pupils’ parents
" pupils
" undergraduate and graduate students
" employees of the Ministry of Education in each country
" religious authorities
" Turkish diplomats in each country
" Turkish Nurcu businessmen
" members of the community in Turkey

The conclusions drawn in this article are tentative. Members of the cemaat in Central
Asia try to spread their ideas secretly because of the authorities’ attitude to religious
influences from abroad. Of course while carrying out my research I won the trust of
some fethullahcı (as the disciples of Fethullah Gülen are known), but this confidence
was not sufficient for me to obtain answers to some of my questions such as the
nature of hierarchy in the movement, the salaries of the teachers or the expenses of
the school.

The Establishing of Schools and their Various Categories

The first schools appeared in the period 1992–93. The time was favourable, for two
reasons. First, at that period the relations between Turkey and the Central Asian
republics were excellent, probably because they were new. There was the question
whether these countries would adopt a ‘Turkish model of development’ (Bal, 1997;
Jalolov, 1994), the context being that of a ‘reunion’ of ‘Turkic brothers’. Second,
Turgut Özal, Turkey’s leader at that time, helped the initial mission activity on the
part of Gülen’s schools. Each school displays a big picture of Turgut Özal.
In fact Gülen’s pioneers did not wait for there to be a favourable context for
beginning their activities in Central Asia. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the independence of the Central Asian states, a good number of businessmen who
were members of the movement came to the region. The missionary spirit of the
movement helped to prepare its way. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union many
Nurcu in various cities in Turkey had been preparing themselves to ‘conquer’ Central
Asia (Can, 1996, pp. 53–61). They included businessmen, students, teachers and
journalists. Just before the independence of the Central Asian republics, Gülen and his
advisors urged these people to go into Central Asia.

They always use the same method: businessmen from a particular city in Turkey,
for example Bursa, will decide to concentrate their efforts on a particular Central
Asian city, for example Tashkent. Nurcu investment will then become important in
Tashkent, and a kind of twinning (kardes, s,ehir) between the two cities results. Nurcu
group members – whom we can consider as missionaries – are sent by the movement
with the aim of making contact with important companies, bureaucrats and personalities
in order to appraise local needs. They then invite some of these important
personalities to Turkey. Some vakıf and other Nurcu organisations receive them and
show them the private schools and foundations of the cemaat, without ever
mentioning this word. Thanks to these contacts it then becomes easy to prepare the
work in Central Asia.

The network of important personalities established in Central Asia has been crucial
for the community. With their help, the cemaat has been able to overcome the bureaucratic
obstacles encountered by every foreigner working to invest there. After their
arrival in each country, thanks to their contacts, the representatives of the cemaat are
given permission to take over an old school and to transform it. The new school will
remain under the control of the state, which helps to maintain it, paying for such
things as gas, water and electricity. On the other hand all the other expenses, for
books, tables, computers, laboratories and so on, are met by the Turkish companies.
The movement’s strategy for establishing itself in Central Asia was quite
successful. In just two years, 1991–93, hundreds of companies and dozens of schools
were opened in Central Asia, as well as the cemaat newspaper Zaman, which was
published in the capital of each republic.

Most of the Turkish companies in Central Asia belong to the Nurcu movement.
Most of them, except Ülker and Barakat (import-export) are small-sized companies
involved with a range of activities like baking, running restaurants, the construction
industry and textile manufacture.6 A company can be described as a ‘Nurcu’ company
when its directors and other members subscribe to the ideas of Nursi and Gülen. The
company will normally try to propagate these ideas in various ways. During the first
years of independence these companies imported books and literature from Turkey
about Said Nursi and his movement.7 Bookshops belonging to the cemaat played an
important role in the distribution of Nurcu literature. For example, the Aydın company
in Almaty and its branch in Tashkent stocked books, reviews, tapes and newspapers
from the cemaat in Turkish, English, Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.
In each country most of the Nurcu companies are members of businessmen’s
associations. For example, in Uzbekistan Özbekistan ve Türkiye Is,adamları Derneg˘i
(The Association of Uzbek and Turkish Businessmen, UTID) tries to favour trade
between Uzbekistan and Turkey.8 In Kyrgyzstan the same service is provided by
Kırgızistan ve Türkiye Is,adamlari Derneg˘i (The Association of Kyrgyz and Turkish
Businessmen (KITIAD)) located in central Bishkek. In Turkmenistan this sort of
organisation is forbidden by law, but the Nurcu have other ways on improving their
investments in that country. In Kazakhstan, Kazakistan ve Türkiye Eg˘itim Vakfı (The
Kazakhstan and Turkey Education Foundation (KATEV)) is entirely Nurcu, although
Kazakistan ve Türkiye Is,adamları Derneg˘i (The Association of Kazakh and Turkish
Businessmen, KATIAD) is not controlled by Gülen’s businessmen. Some non-Nurcu
are allowed into all these organisations, but they are a minority.

It is impossible to study the cemaat presence in Central Asia without mentioning
the role of Zaman,9 the famous Nurcu newspaper which is at present distributed in
three of the Central Asian capital cities, Bishkek, Ashgabat and Almaty. Efforts to
establish Zaman in Central Asia began just after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This proved to be easy except in Tashkent where after two years of publication it was
closed by the Uzbek government, which was hostile to Turkey and Turkish schools.
In each country, Zaman has been supplementing the mission of schools in Central
Asia. Some teachers, for example, work both in schools and for Zaman, and the paper
sometimes recruits pupils from these schools where Turkish is taught. Like that of
other Nurcu companies, the purpose of Zaman is to help the schools to fulfil the
mission of the Nurcu movement.

In 1998–99 there were about 75 Nurcu educational establishments in Central Asia.10
However, we should bear in mind that schools inspired by Fethullah Gülen’s ideas are
to be found throughout Eurasia (see Table 1).

The worldwide extent of Fethullah Gülen’s educational network testifies to the
internationalist, even imperialist, nature of the movement. It is densest in the former
socialist bloc, especially in the former Soviet Union. We know that Gülen often
expresses his admiration and nostalgia for the imperial Ottoman past (Gülen, 1994,
pp. 1–5). As former Ottoman provinces the Balkan states are very important for the
movement. The movement’s schools are also present in Western Europe, especially
among the Turkish communities in France, Germany and The Netherlands.11 We
should note that the movement is very weakly represented in the Arab world. In Iraq,
its schools are attended mainly by ethnic Turkmen children. In the whole Turco-
Islamic area the strongest presence of these schools is in Central Asia (see Table 2).
Schools are not present to the same degree in each country of Central Asia. The
most populous republic is Uzbekistan, but it is no longer the one with the most
schools. For various reasons Tashkent has always tried to limit their presence, and
they have been forbidden since September 2000. The Uzbek government in fact wants
to place limits on any kind of Turkish presence in the country. Crises are chronic
between Tashkent and Ankara. The first crisis arose because Uzbek opposition
leaders Muhammad Salih, chairman of Erk, and Abdurrahman Polat, chairman of
Birlik, fled as refugees to Turkey when they were threatened by the Uzbek government.
Karimov demanded that the Turkish authorities expel them, fearing that they
would influence Uzbek students in Turkey, but met with a refusal. Karimov is also
Table 1.

Worldwide distribution of schools of Fethullah Gülen’s movement
Country Number of schools Number of pupils Number of teachers
from Turkey
Kazakhstan 29 5684 580
Azerbaijan 12 3023 338
Uzbekistan 18 3334 210
Turkmenistan 13 3294 353
Kyrgyzstan 12 3100 323
Tajikistan 5 694 107
Tatarstan 6 1802 217
Russia 5 323 63
Chuvashia 2 311 79
Bashkiria 3 462 88
Karachai 1 93 13
Crimea 2 218 47
Siberia 4 438 101
Dagestan 5 938 123
Georgia 3 244 48
Mongolia 4 442 85
Bulgaria 4 523 123
Moldavia 2 225 40
Romania 4 415 78
Albania 2 966 74
Bosnia 2 109 22
Macedonia 1 102 16
Iraq 4 184 26
Australia 5 718 37
Indonesia 1 41 18
Total 149 27,683 3209

Source: Yurtdıs,ında Açılan Özel Eg˘itim Kurumları Temsilcileri: Ikinci Toplantısı (Second
Assembly of Representatives of Turkish Private Educational Companies Abroad) (Ankara,
Milli Eg˘itim Bakanlıg˘ı Yurtdıs,ı Genel Müdürlüg˘ü, 1997). I have updated some of the statistics
given in this book as a result of conversations during the course of my research with the
managers of the schools in the Central Asian republics.

hostile to a strong Turkish foreign policy in Uzbekistan (and indeed in Central Asia as
a whole). His aim is to deal not exclusively with Turkey but also with other countries,
including Russia. There is a third reason for Karimov’s hostility to the Nurcu
movement. When they first settled in Uzbekistan Fethullah Gülen’s disciples openly
tried to proselytise their students. They taught them the namaz and recommended
young girls to wear headscarves.

The largest number of schools is at the moment in Kazakhstan where the cemaat
now runs 28 high schools and the Süleyman Demirel University. One factor favouring
the growth in the number of schools is that Kazakhstan is administratively less
centralised than the other states. In Kazakhstan the administrator of a region (oblast’)
has the prerogative of reaching educational agreements with foreign companies. In
1991 and 1992 representatives of Gülen signed their agreements with regional
governors. Meanwhile the Kazakh government has favoured this cooperation as it has
helped it to speed up the ‘kazakhisation’ of the country and to reduce the extensive
Russian influence.

Turkish schools are quite numerous in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, despite their
relatively low population. The cemaat is very active in Turkmenistan because two of
its members are advisors of President Niyazov (the minister of Textiles and minister
of Education). One of the two universities in Ashgabat belongs to the cemaat.12
Modern and Successful Schools thanks to Foreign Languages and Science
Lessons.

The management of these schools in each republic is in the hands of a ‘General
Directorate’ (Genel Müdürlük) located in the capital city and affiliated to a big
education company in Turkey. In Uzbekistan the schools are run by Silm Anonim
S, irketi, located in Bursa in Turkey. In Kazakhstan Feza and S, elale (both in Istanbul)
run the Turko-Kazakh schools. In Kyrgyzstan the schools were founded by Sebat
(Adapazari) and in Turkmenistan by Bas,kent (Ankara). Each company is in
permanent contact with its directors in Turkey and has a representative in Istanbul.
They also maintain good relations with Türkiye Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (The
Foundation of Journalists and Writers of Turkey), a prestigious Nurcu foundation.13
Advisors from this Foundation help high schools to keep up good contacts with the
Central Asian republics. It usually happens that the general director (genel müdür) of
Table 2. The schools of Fethullah Gülen’s movement in Central Asia (1997–98)*

Country Population Number of Number of Number of Name of the
(Millions) Nurcu pupils teachers company in
schools from Turkey Turkey and its
location
Uzbekistan 24 18 3334 210 Silm, Bursa
Kazakhstan 17 29 5644 580 Feza et S,elale,
Istanbul
Kyrgyzstan 5 12 3100 323 Sebat, Adapazarı
Turkmenistan 4 15 3294 353 Bas,kent, Ankara
Total 50 74 15,372 1466
*For Said Nursi’s conception of education see his Risale-i-Nur. In Central Asian schools
teachers used Soylemez, 1997.

schools in each republic is member of this Foundation. Asya Finans, a cemaat bank in
Turkey, helps Nurcu businessmen with their investments in Central Asia and plays an
important role in the transfer of money from Nurcu companies in Turkey to schools in
Central Asia.14 In each republic continuous dialogue and cooperation between the big
Nurcu companies and the directors of the schools promotes good working conditions
for the latter. Very often the directors of groups of schools in these republics go to
Turkey to coordinate their activities in Central Asia.

In each republic the schools are run by directors, teachers and tutors. There is a
clear sense of hierarchy in the schools. At the top of the hierarchy is the general
director who is in charge of all the schools in the republic. At the next level, each
school is managed by its own director. These directors have to meet once a month in
the capital city (Tashkent, Bishkek, Almaty or Ashgabat) and the general manager
explains their mission to them. In the General Directorate there is an individual in
charge of each discipline (biology, mathematics, etc.) called zümre bas,kanları in the
jargon of the community. Each zümre bas,kanı is responsible for the preparation of an
annual syllabus for his subject. The General Directorate of all schools is responsible
for the foreign policy of its company in the given country. For example, it has to
maintain good relations with the government of this country, with the Ministry of
Education, with universities and with all-important organisations in the country. It is
also the intermediary between the schools in its republic and the Nurcu movement in
Turkey. Last but not least, the heads of Nurcu businesses or trading companies in
Central Asia or in Turkey negotiate with the general director about the assistance they
provide to schools.

The teachers (ög˘retmenler) are carefully selected. They are usually recruited within
cemaat circles; at the very least they will have been known to the cemaat for a long
time. It is relevant here to consider how an individual becomes a member of the
cemaat. It is not like joining a sports club or a political party. There is no membership
card, and no special ceremony when somebody becomes a fethullahcı. Each member
offers his or her services – hizmet – to help in the diffusion of the ideas of Nursi and
Gülen. He or she has to accept the mission given by the community. There are a
number of degrees of membership of the community: an individual can be an active
member, a simple member or a sympathiser. Most of the fethullahcı I met in Central
Asia became members of the community thanks to their family or their friends at
work or at school. They were educated in the community’s private schools, staying in
students’ residences or the famous ıs,ık evleri (‘houses of light’): flats belonging to the
cemaat or rented by cemaat businessmen where young students – usually from poor
families – are allowed to stay during their studies. Each ‘house of light’ is under the
direction of an abi (big brother) who helps to educate the residents. The selection of
teachers is done by the representative in Turkey of each of the companies (S,elale,
Bas,kent, Silm and Sebat). The selected teachers and tutors (belletmen) therefore have
the same characteristics.15 As well as being competent in their particular subject they
are of course ready to serve the community. Obviously, each candidate will be well
known before his or her recruitment. He or she will usually have been introduced to
the company by friends who are already members of the community.

Cemaat spokesmen claim that their teachers in Central Asia come from the best
universities in Turkey like Bog˘aziçi, Bilkent, Marmara or ODTÜ. The Turkish media
also tend to spread the same information.16 My research in Central Asia has shown
that the reality is quite different, however. Of course some teachers obtained their
diplomas at Bog˘aziçi, Bilkent or other prestigious universities, but they are a minority
and they are always sent by their administration to the most popular and prestigious
schools. In Turkmenistan, for example, Turgut Özal High School attracts the best
cemaat teachers. The situation is however completely different in other schools in the
provinces, in places like Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk), Tashauz or Nebit-
Dag. In these schools most teachers come from less prestigious universities like
Erzurum, Samsun or Yozgat. The situation is the same in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. The high schools in each capital city are the best because they have
the best teachers, but why is there such a difference between the capital cities and the
provinces? During their visits to Turkic Central Asian countries Turkish officials –
president, prime minister, deputies or military delegations – visit one of the cemaat
schools because of their importance in cultural relations between Turkey and these
countries. The visitors are always taken to the same school: the best one.

The tutors (belletmen) are the other important pillar of the community in Central
Asia. They are usually students and members of the cemaat in Turkey. They come to
Central Asia for various reasons: some because they have not passed their university
examinations, some because they want to travel and see new places. Recruited by the
representatives of the active company in the various Turkic republics, these students
are assisted by the cemaat. Their company pays for their studies in Central Asian
universities (history, economics, English, Russian, Uzbek or Kazakh literature are
typical subjects) and arranges for them to stay in schools. They sleep in the dormitory,
like the pupils for whom they become responsible. Their mission is simple: to act as
elder brothers to the young pupils, who call them abi (elder brother). They have to
help them to do their homework and prepare them for their lessons. They give them
an elementary education in everything from table manners to resolving conflicts with
family or friends. When the pupils are at their lessons the tutor is free to attend the
university. The arrangement is a good one for the tutor: his studies, food and accommodation
are free. The education company stands in the same relationship to him as
he does to his pupils. His most important mission is to transmit the message of the
community to these children. Around 90 per cent of the tutors are male (the same
percentage as for the teachers). (It is not impossible to find female cemaat members
in Central Asia, but they are rare.) In the first crisis between the cemaat and the
government in Uzbekistan most of the cemaat members the government expelled
were tutors.

The way pupils are selected for cemaat high schools is quite eloquent as regards
cemaat ideology. In Turkey the community’s method of selection is elitist. The
concept of Altın Nesil (the Gold Generation) is an important one for Gülen and his
followers: the aim is to provide ‘a perfect education for a perfect generation in order
to obtain a perfect society’. ‘Altın Nesil’ also requires the young people of the
community to show a great respect for religious and national values. This generation
has to be modern and disciplined. The community therefore offers its members
the best schools and the best teachers. In Central Asia the cemaat follows the same
principles: it tries to select the best pupils. Every year representatives of the Turkish
school directorate in each republic organise examinations with the help of the local
teachers in order to select the best pupils for the community’s high schools.
At the beginning these schools were free everywhere, but nowadays the parents
have to pay charges, which vary amongst the republics, depending on the number and
the wealth of the Turkish companies which support the schools. In every republic,
however, the schools managements told us that in future every school would require
contributions from the parents. In Kazakhstan in 1998–99 parents were paying a
charge for the canteen and for the books, some of which were expensive because they
were imported (like English handbooks imported directly from Great Britain),17 while
the remaining expenses were covered by Turkish companies. In Turkmenistan the
schooling was free at the beginning, but now each pupil has to pay US $1000 a year.18
In Uzbekistan the schooling was free except at the Ulugbek International School (a
combined high school and university) where in 1999 one year cost US $5000 dollars.
The economic crisis in Russia in summer 1998 affected the Central Asia economies
and also the situation for parents with children at the Turkish schools. When Turkish
businessmen and educators originally arrived in the Central Asian republics they were
sure that oil and other resources would soon boost the local economies, but in 2000
they were still waiting for the economic growth to begin.19

After they have been admitted to a Turkish (Nurcu) school, the pupils embark on a
life that is completely different from that in other schools. All the pupils have to board
and sleep in a dormitory even if their family lives locally. Pupils are allowed to spend
their weekends at home; but sometimes they will stay at school for a month or
even longer without visiting their families. This boarding school system allows the
educators to exert a strict control over their students in order to teach them the
message of the community. The fethullahcı method is similar to that of the Jesuits in
that the pupils are permanently being educated regardless of whether they are in the
classroom or the dormitory. In most schools in Central Asia pupils wear what they
want, but in the Turkish schools pupils wear a special uniform. The school managers
argue that this allows them to erase any class differences amongst the children.
The prestigious Anadolu Fen Liseleri schools in Turkey are a model for Turkish
schools in Central Asia. Like the Anadolu Liseleri, Nurcu high schools prepare their
pupils very well for university entrance examinations.

Books and programmes in these schools are often the same, and the cemaat even
has its own publisher, Sürat Yayınları. Pupils enter Turkish schools after what would
have been the fifth or the sixth class in the old Soviet system, after having passed
difficult exams. During the first year pupils learn English and Turkish. They attend
English classes for about 15–20 hours a week. This is very important because
after this first year the lessons are taught in English and Turkish. After the first
(preparatory) class, the pupils study for four years preparing for university entrance
examinations. Scientific subjects such as biology, mathematics, physics and computer
science are a priority throughout. This is a Nurcu principle: Said Nursi attached much
importance to the teaching of scientific subjects in schools (Yavuz, 1999c). One of his
main projects (a couple of decades ago) was to introduce the teaching of sciences in
religious schools and of religion in scientific schools. In each country one or two of
these schools specialise in economics or theology. Called Oriental High Schools, they
are a perfect copy of Turkey’s Imam Hatip Liseleri.

In these schools pupils learn the Arabic language, the Quran and Islamic history.
These schools constitute a small minority: there are only two in Kazakhstan, one in
Turkmenistan and one in Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan oriental studies are under state
control. Foreign languages and scientific teaching in these schools are appreciated by
parents who do all they can to send their children there. Foreign languages allow their
children to obtain good jobs in foreign companies and to study at famous universities.
The authorities are also quite interested in these schools. Large numbers of bureaucrats
and administrators send their children there, and they speak out in their defence.
For the government, these schools are interesting partners in helping them to form a
new elite. Each school has Turkish as well as local (Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
Turkmen) teachers. The scientific subjects are in the hands of the Turks and the rest
(local history, literature) are taught by local teachers, although the Turkish teachers
may also teach the Turkish language and Turkish history and geography. In all the
republics each school usually has one director, a Turk, except for Uzbekistan, where
since the crisis of 1993 each school has two directors, one a Turk and one an Uzbek
(see Table 3).

The Raison d’être of these Schools: Fethullah Gülen’s Myth and Dream for
Central Asia

Fethullah Gülen has very often been interrogated by the Turkish media about his
intentions in Central Asia. Before giving his answers, Gülen has usually recalled that
the schools do not belong to him, and has repeated that all companies in Turkey and
Central Asia, which are supposed to belong to him, are in fact independent. He is
indeed correct: officially these schools and companies such as Asya Finans, Zaman
and Samanyolu TV are not his own property. However, he has a great influence on
them. There are businessmen and intellectuals who accept him as their moral leader –
they call him hocaefendi, respected lord – and have undertaken to fulfill his dream for
Central Asia.

What is this dream
Nostalgic for the Ottoman Empire and its greatness, Gülen also worships Central
Asia. According to him, Anatolia is indebted to Asia for its high degree of civilisation;
without Asia, Islam and Turkish culture would never have established themselves
there. We know that in the distant past Islam and Turkish culture arrived in
Anatolia from Asia as a result of the missionary activities of dervishes and of mystics
called alperen (Köprülü, 1993). Gülen frequently refers to these alperen and
compares his followers to them.20 He exaggerates their influence, however. He
mystifies it, forgetting that there were important civilisations in Anatolia before Islam
and the Turks. He sees the activities of his followers in Central Asia today as a sort of
repayment of a moral debt (Gülen, 1997). In his interviews he frequently uses the
term medyun (Arabic for ‘indebted’).

When we ask the followers of Gülen about their motivation in coming to Central
Asia, they give the same answer as their chief: ‘we are here to pay our debt, our moral
debt, vefa borcu’. They repeat that their ancestors went from here to Anatolia. There
is no nationalist or panturkist aspect to their veneration of their ancestors (and indeed,
for example, there are many Kurds teaching in the schools in Central Asia and Kurds
are important in the movement in Turkey). In this respect they are completely
different from the representatives of Türk Dünyası Aras, tırmaları Vakfi (The
Foundation for Turkic World Research (TDAV)) who are also present in some
schools in Central Asia teaching Turkish, economics and other subjects.21 Like their
chief, the fethullahcı are moderates and never express strong nationalistic or Islamic
ideas. They repeat that their mission in Central Asia consists in building a cultural
bridge between Turkey and its Turkic sister republics. In fact all the members of
Turkish community in Central Asia justify its presence in the same way.

Detailed research into the real project of the cemaat shows that the Nurcu movement
in Central Asia is a real missionary movement. The mission of the fethullahcı is
to reestablish Islam in an area that was dominated for 70 years by an atheist power.
Their methods recall those of the Jesuits (Giacomelli, 1991; Faguer, 1991). We can
also compare them with the American Peace Corps, which is present in Central Asia
(Schwarz, 1991). The feature all three movements have in common is the use of the
school as a means to propagate an ideology. All three missionary movements try to
maintain excellent relations with the local people in order to ‘convert’ them. They
even submit themselves to their influence in order to influence them more easily.22
Gülen, for instance, recommends that his followers respect the habits and traditions of
the people who receive them, and marry local girls.

The method of the Nurcu missionaries has distinctive characteristics. Despite the
allegations of the Turkish media – especially the kemalist media – the Nurcu schools
are not directly an instrument of proselytism. Ironically, the Nurcu would in fact
prefer to practise their Islamic proselytism openly. It seems to have been their aim to
do so when they arrived in Central Asia at the beginning of the 1990s, and it was
probably because of their open activities in schools that the Uzbek government
expelled some missionaries in 1993–94.23 In Central Asia today, where the legislation
and institutions are secular, part of the Soviet legacy, Gülen thinks that it is dangerous
and unrealistic to try to spread Islam without being cautious. He recommends less
conspicuous ways of Islamising the younger generation, and his followers seem to
have been following his guidelines.

Gülen explains to his disciples the difference between teblig˘ and temsil. Teblig˘
means open proselytism, and Gülen asks his followers not to practice this. He argues
that today’s societies are subjected to so much political, religious and philosophical
propaganda that people are weary of proselytism. In his view teblig˘ creates a
Table 3. Subjects taught in the Turkish schools in Turkmenistan, 1997–98
Subjects 6th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Language
Class, Class, Class Class Class Class of
1st 2nd Instruction
Semester Semester
Turkmen language
and literature 4 3 5 3 3 3 Turkmen
Turkish language 7 7 3 3 3 3 Turkish
English 20 15 6 4 4 4 English
Russian 1 1 2 1 2 1 Russian
Mathematics 2 7 7 6 7 English
Physics 3 5 5 5 English
Chemistry 2 4 4 4 English
Biology 2 4 4 4 English
Science 3 English
Computer skills 2 3 Turkish
History of
Turkmenistan 2 1 1 1 Turkmen
General history 1 2 1 1 Turkish
General geography 2 1 1 Turkish
Geography of
Turkmenistan 1 1 Turkmen
The President’s
Policies 1 Turkmen
Morality (Edep) 1 1 Turkish
History of religions 1 1 1 1 Turkish
Philosophy 2 Turkish
Sport 2 2 2 2 2 2 Turkmen
Music 1 1 1 Turkmen
Drawing 1 1 1 Turkmen
Total hours 37 36 38 41 41 41
Source: The General Directorate of the Turkish-Turkmen Schools in Turkmenistan.
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 163
gap between the man who knows and the other who does not know, a complex of
superiority and inferiority between the preacher and those he is preaching to, and
complicates the mission of Muslims. He strongly advises them to practise temsil,
which he considers the best way of preaching. A preacher practising temsil will live
an Islamic way of life at all times wherever he is, but will never utter the word ‘Islam’
or other ‘dangerous words’. Temsil missionaries set a good example, embodying their
ideals in their way of life rather than preaching about them.
Before analysing the methods employed by Gülen’s disciples to realise his
programme we should look more closely at what they are trying to achieve.
‘Introducing Islam into Central Asia’ is not an appropriate description of what the
fethullahcı are doing. All these countries are already Muslim. This Islam is not now
what it was in the past, however. After long Soviet domination it has been weakened
and often perverted (Gross, 1998; Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1986). The Nurcu
movement aims to help the people of this huge area to rediscover Islam. All
fethullahcı hope for a real rebirth of Islam in the region. Schools are to help them in
this mission: here we observe a point in common between the Nurcu and the historical
jadid movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the aim of which was to
promote the modernisation of Central Asian societies, changing society by means of
education (Dudoignon, 1996). The nature of Nurcu Islam in Central Asia is the same
as it is in Turkey: modern and moderate; not at all hostile to secular power; elitist.
Cemaat Islam has no difficulty in adapting itself to Central Asian Islam because they
share a common feature, namely respect for mysticism. The cemaat is not a brotherhood
like the Naqshbandiyya or the Yeseviyya, very important movements in Central
Asia, but it respects them and shares some of their characteristics. For example, like
all the Muslims of Central Asia, the Turkish missionaries often visit the tombs of
Bahauddin Naqshbandi and Ahmed Yesevi. Their practice of Islam is the same too:
the Muslims of Turkey and the Muslims of Central Asia pray in the same way.
Compared to the Wahhabis, whose Islamic views and practices are somewhat
different from those traditional in Central Asia – they are for example opposed to the
‘brotherhoods’ – the followers of Fethullah Gülen have no difficulties in adapting to
this region.
Appropriate practices are faithfully followed in Central Asia. The directors of a
Nurcu high school will for example never impose books by Said Nursi or Fethullah
Gülen on the children, nor will Turkish teachers in these schools ever recommend
such books to local teachers (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, etc.). Religious discussions and the
readings of Risale-i-Nur (Epistle of the Light) (Nursi, 1999) are usually limited
to people from Turkey. Teachers, businessmen and Nurcu students will organise
discussions (çay sohbetleri) once a week or so in order to improve their Islamic and
Nurcu knowledge. (I was allowed to attend such discussions in Uzbekistan, but
the organisers stopped the meetings in May 1999 after Turkish–Uzbek relations
deteriorated.) Although it is not much in evidence in the schools, Nurcu literature is
easy to find in Central Asian cities, in bookshops or near mosques. Nursi has been
translated into every Central Asian language (as well as Russian). Some short
chapters of Risale-i-Nur have been translated into Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and
Turkmen. Namaz and oruç (prayer and fasting) are officially forbidden in schools.
After the crisis with the Uzbek government in 1993 the General Directorate of the
schools and the director of each high school decided to forbid Islamic practice in the
schools as dangerous for the future of the movement in Central Asia. The movement
has developed a special strategy, however. Officially, the director and teachers in a
school will tell the pupils that prayer and fasting are forbidden. At parents’ meetings
164 Bayram Balcı
the director will explain to them that the schools are not religious schools. At the
same time, however, the same director will be telling the tutors to select a minority of
pupils, teach them how to pray and give them an elementary Islamic education; the
tutors must tell the pupils that this must remain a secret between him and them. The
tutor’s strategy must consist in appearing to be his pupils’ confidential friend (abi),
and not the teacher’s representative whose job is to keep an eye on the pupils. Only
small groups are selected for this religious education, but in the pupils’ last year at
school, a couple of months before they leave, the tutors give them more Islamic
lessons. Of course there are numerous differences amongst the countries. In
Uzbekistan, for example, because it is really too dangerous, the Nurcu have engaged
in no proselytising since the very beginning, in 1992–93. President Karimov’s anger
at the activities of Islamists in the Fergana Valley means that he no longer tolerates
any Islamic proselytism on the territory of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan it is easier for
the cemaat to teach Islam to pupils. In Kyrgyzstan everything is possible; in
Turkmenistan the situation is the same as in Uzbekistan.
Cemaat Strategy to Win Over Turkish Diplomats and Local Authorities
The current conditions in Central Asia make it too difficult for the cemaat to diffuse
Islam. It was easier to do so in the early years of independence. In all these countries
Islam obtained the support of the postcommunist powers. Everywhere new mosques
were built and those transformed into factories during the Soviet period were
reopened. In order to indicate a break with the past the leaders of the newly independent
states accepted some Islamic practices and integrated them into the new
national identities. This situation gave the cemaat the illusion that it was possible to
preach openly, but its members soon understood that the real situation was different.
In Uzbekistan, for example, the authorities saw Islam becoming powerful in the
Fergana valley and feared that it would threaten the new state. They decided to limit
the Islamisation of society.24 The president closed some mosques in Fergana and a
couple of Turkish fethullahcı schools.
Forced to adjust their strategy to these new conditions, Gülen’s followers changed
their method and developed their cooperation with Central Asian governments and
with Turkish embassies. If the priority of the cemaat is to reintroduce Islam into
Central Asia after its eclipse under Soviet atheist domination, it is also indirectly
contributing to the propagation of Turkism (Turkish consciousness) and Turkish
influence in the Turkic Republics. In spite of its missionary character the cemaat
quickly becomes a sort of private company that offers its services. The community
has developed a special strategy to win the trust of many social actors (embassies,
ministries, governments, universities and parents, for example). At first, the cemaat
won the trust of parents and educators thanks to its high level of success in preparing
pupils for university exams. A majority of pupils coming from Turkish schools
entered prestigious universities in their country or abroad. (According to cemaat
statistics nearly 90 per cent of students pass their university entrance examinations.)
In Tashkent the famous university of diplomacy has several students from Turkish
colleges. In Ashgabat, Almaty and Bishkek pupils from cemaat schools study at the
best universities. In the former Soviet Union there was a tradition of ‘Olympiad’
examinations. Every year a series of examinations would select the best pupils in the
school, the village, the town, the region and finally the republic. After their arrival
in Central Asia, Turkish missionaries adopted this tradition. They developed it by
organising ‘International Olympiads’ in Central Asia or abroad. Students from
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 165
Turkish schools would frequently do very well in these examinations, and this of
course would make the cemaat more popular in the eyes of parents and authorities
alike.25
The methods used by the cemaat to recruit its pupils mean that its schools include
a large number of children of the elite of the nation. Leading businessmen and
bureaucrats send their children to these schools because of the high probability that
they will pass their university entrance examinations. There is usually therefore a real
harmony between parents and the teachers, whom they much appreciate. This is very
important because it helps the cemaat to defend its schools, if it proves necessary to
do so, against threats by the authorities. The parents will usually lobby on behalf of
the cemaat. After the first crisis in Uzbekistan the intervention of some important
parents dissuaded the authorities from expelling the cemaat from the country
altogether. Of course these groups are not strong enough ultimately to save the
cemaat, as it was shown in Uzbekistan in September 2000.

A strategy of seduction is employed by the cemaat not only towards parents but
towards local governments too. In order to guarantee its presence in each country, the
cemaat offers its support for the government’s policy and postsoviet ideology. In the
schools Gülen’s followers teach the students to love the new independent state, the
president, the flag, the new institutions, the new heroes who have been chosen by the
new regimes and so on. For the same purpose, the General Directorate of the high
schools will have some of the president’s books translated into Turkish and
distributed in Turkey. The schools thus become ambassadors to Turkey for these
Central Asian regimes, promoting their culture and history and also, of course, as
mentioned above, contributing to the formation of new local elites.

We should pay special attention to the relations between the cemaat and Turkish
embassies in Central Asia. These relationships have often been supposed to be bad,
based on suspicion and characterised by conflict. It is true that in the early 1990s a
conflictual relationship developed between the Turkish embassy in Tashkent and the
Directorate of the cemaat schools there. The crisis between the cemaat and the Uzbek
government was provoked by a report produced by the Turkish embassy about the
nature of the Nurcu movement. The report warned the Uzbek government about the
danger of this movement, which according to the embassy’s research had proved to be
fundamentalist and Islamist. This instance was an exception in Turkey’s attitude to
cemaat activities in Central Asia, however. The attitude of the Turkish government
has usually been to support the movement (although Turgut Özal was more actively
supportive than his successors Ciller, Demirel, Ecevit and Sezer have been).27 In
Uzbekistan, as in the other countries of Central Asia, a school may be opened only if
the Turkish government (represented by its embassy) gives its agreement.

InUzbekistan the charter on educational cooperation is signed by three people representing
respectively Tashkent, Ankara and the Silm educational and publishing
company. The Directorate of schools in each Central Asian country is in permanent
contact with the cultural and linguistic attaché (Eg˘itim Müs, aviri ve Kültür Atas, esi) of
the Turkish embassy. These two institutions cooperate actively. The embassy will
help the cemaat by supplying books, for example. Sometimes the two institutions
make joint preparations for national Turkish festivals (23 April and 29 October).
There are harmonious relations between the embassies and the cemaat because they
have similar missions and projects in Central Asia. Ankara’s ambition is to create
strong relations with these republics, which requires the development of cultural and
economic relations between Turkey and Central Asia; this in turn requires knowledge
of the Turkish language (which differs sufficiently from Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and
166 Bayram Balcı

Turkmen). The development of Turkish language teaching, and of Turkish studies in
general, is one of Ankara’s priorities in the region. For this purpose the Turkish state
has opened two universities (Ahmed Yesevi (Balcı, 1999) in Kazakhstan and Manas
in Kyrgyzstan) and a couple of state schools in the area. Turkish diplomats observe,
however, that the Turkish government’s cultural and educational efforts in Central
Asia are nothing compared with the educational network of the cemaat. The state has
to pay each teacher between US $600 and US $1000 a month, but cemaat members
agree to work for US $500 or as little as US $200 a month everywhere in Asia: as
missionaries they have more motivation than state employees. The dormitory system
in cemaat schools allows the pupils to learn the Turkish language much more easily
and quickly than in the state schools. The cemaat schools are generally more
prestigious than state schools and are very important for Turkish policy in Central
Asia. For all these reasons the Turkish government supports these schools in the
Turkic republics.

We may observe a sharp contrast between the attitude of the Turkish authorities
towards the cemaat in Turkey and their attitude to the cemaat abroad. Some elements
of the state authorities in Turkey (though not all) consider the movement to be
dangerous in Turkey, but the same authorities support it in Central Asia, where the
Nurcu are helping the state to create a Turkish world. There was a similar situation in
France during the Third Republic. All the governments of the Third Republic were
very hostile to religion. Anticlericalism was the dogma of the state. This did not
however prevent it from giving active support to French missionary movements in the
Middle East and Africa. The reason is the same in both cases: Realpolitik.

There is another reason too. The presence of Turkish schools is favourable for the
development of Turkism (Turkish consciousness). Turkish diplomacy has difficulties
in exporting its own definition of a Turkish identity. The Turkish vision of Turkism is
that Turks (of Turkey), Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and others are different
branches of a same larger Turkish ethnic family. For the new independent states,
however, the most important thing is not Turkism but ‘Uzbekism’, ‘Kazakhism’ and
so on. While Ankara wants to develop the existing common points the authorities
in the other Turkic states prefer strengthening Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen
identity. In every state school in these Central Asian countries children learn the new
grammar of nationalism. In the cemaat schools, however, pupils learn not only the
notion of Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen identity but also the important concept
of ‘Turkism’. As I sat in on lessons in some of these schools I was able to observe
how their identity was simultaneously Uzbek and Turk, Kazakh and Turk, Kyrgyz
and Turk, Turkmen and Turk. Without resorting to irredentism or panturkism, the
cemaat schools thus help the formation of a common Turkish identity linking Turkey
and the Turkic republics of Central Asia.

Last but not least, the role of these schools, with the Nurcu companies and
businessmen’s associations (UTID, KITIAD), is important in the development of
economic relations between Turkey and these republics. More than half the Turkish
companies in Central Asia are Nurcu companies.

Conclusion

The first ambition of the fethullahcı is of course to work for the re-Islamisation of the
Central Asian republics. Indirectly and sometimes directly, however, because of the
patriotic element in the ideology of the Nurcu movement, the cemaat are in fact
spreading the Turkish model rather than Islamic thought. Because of the deep-rooted
distrust of Islamism of these Central Asian countries the cemaat cannot appear with
its authentic identity. Of course, a minority of people know that this organisation is a
religious one. But usually, when you arrive in a particular city, the inhabitants will tell
you that a good Turkish school has been opened, by Turks. None of the local people
in Central Asia talks about ‘Nurcu’ or ‘fethullahcı’ schools, but always about the
‘turestky litsey’or the ‘turk maktabi’.

The cemaat is interested in trying to maintain contact with pupils after they have
left its schools. It organises reunions for its alumni in Tashkent, Almaty, Ashgabat,
Bishkek and other cities. The purpose of these meetings is to help maintain the
students’ sympathy for the Nurcu movement. It is not clear how far they are
successful in this. The students, who include future members of the elites in their
countries, will certainly tend to develop relations with Turkey; but there is no
guarantee that they will retain all the ideology of the cemaat. When they go on to
university they come under other influences, as they do from their friends or family.
Because they offer a good modern education the Nurcu schools have become a
model in Central Asia. They therefore play a real part in social change in the area
(Balcı, Akkok and Demir Engin, 2000). One open question is how far the cemaat has
diversified in Central Asia. Does the movement already have enough local representatives
to allow us to talk about an Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Turkmen ‘fethullahcı
branch’? My own estimate is that the movement in Central Asia is still probably 95 to
100 per cent Turk. An important factor here is the attitude of the local secular
authorities to proselytism: ‘conversions’ to Nurcu ideas are rare, and kept secret.
Recruitment was easy in the first years of independence but is now difficult. Of
course in each country we find a small number of ‘converts’; but new local members
of the movement tend to be in the schools rather than in other sectors of society. After
they have finished their studies they tend to be recruited as teachers or tutors. Is this
enough to show that the Nurcu movement has put down strong roots in Central Asia?
We shall know the answer to this question only after the liberalisation of the countries
concerned.

Notes
1 I would like to thank the Institut Français d’Études sur l’Asie Centrale of Tashkent where I
was able to spend three years doing the research for this article.
2 On the life and ideas of Said Nursi, see two main references: Mürsel, 1991 and Mardin,
1989.
3 For more detailed analyses of Gülen’s movement in Turkey see: Yavuz, 1999a, 1999b,
1999c; Can, 1996; Erdog˘an, 1997.
4 Some high schools have been set up in Tajikistan too: in Dushanbe, Khojand, Kulyab and
Kurgan-Tyube. When I visited Tajikistan in July 1998 they totalled five. My research is
however limited to the Turkic republics of Central Asia; I do not include Persian-language
Tajikistan.
5 It is difficult to separate the two fields (Turkey and Central Asia). I chose to limit my
research to Central Asia, but sometimes I had to go to Turkey to make important contacts.
For information on the activity, importance and strength of the cemaat in Turkey see
Yavuz, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c and Aras, 1998.
6 For example, cemaat firms in Uzbekistan in May 2000 included Nur-Efs,an (chocolate),
Efendim (restaurant), Nil JV (napkins), Ikbal (clothes). Prominent cemaat companies in
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 included Herkül (biscuits), Gök-Nur (cleaning products), Pak-Maya
(bakery and cakes). These lists of companies were compiled by UTID and KITIAD.
7 The Sözler Yayınevi publishing company in Cag˘alog˘lu-Istanbul has translated some
168 Bayram Balcı
chapters of Risale-i-Nur into various Turkic languages (as well as Russian and Serbo-
Croat). They are usually the shortest and easiest chapters of this large religious work. For
example, Küçük Sözer (Short Words), Tabiat Risalesi (Epistle on Nature) and Yirmiüçüncü
Söz (The Twenty-Third Word) have been on sale in several Central Asian cities. None of
Gülen’s books have been translated into Central Asian languages, however.
8 The aim of UTID is to make Turkish investment in Uzbekistan easier. Every Uzbek or
Turkish company can become member of this association if it pays US $1000 for membership
and thereafter US $100 a month. UTID offers its members investment advice and can
translate Uzbek and Russian documents for them. In 2000 UTID was in bad relations with
the Uzbek government because of a political crisis between Tashkent and Ankara. The
UTID leader was declared persona non grata in Uzbekistan in April 2000. At the same
time, President Karimov received President Putin of Russia.
9 See the website www.zaman.com.tr. This site provides some good links to Zaman in
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
10 The number has since fallen because the Uzbek government closed all the schools on its
territory in 1999 and 2000.
11 The cemaat has been active in Germany since the beginning of the 1980s, and in 2001 it set
up two associations in Paris and Strasbourg providing weekend lessons for the children of
the Turkish community. On the activities of the cemaat in Germany and the Balkans, see
the research of Bekim Agai at the University of Bochum.
12 See the table on Turkmenistan in Appendix 1. The most important university in Ashgabat is
Mahdumkuli State University. There are some cemaat teachers in this university too. After
the cemaat founded the Uluslararasi Türk–Türkmen Üniversitesi (International Turkish-
Turkmen University), however, all cemaat teachers have been going to the new university.
13 See the website www.yazarlarvakfi.com.tr.
14 Questioned by journalists about the management of schools, Gülen said that the mission of
the Asya Finans bank was to help with their administration. See Sevindi, 1997.
15 Author’s interviews with teachers in Nebit-Dag, Turkmenistan.
16 Ali Bayramog˘lu and S, ahin Alpay are two writers well known for their laudatory reporting
about the Gülen community in Central Asia. See for example Yeni Yüzyıl, 30 October 1996
and Milliyet, 2 November 1996.
17 English-language handbooks are imported directly from Oxford, but some popular Turkish
stories in English (like Kelog˘lan and Yunus Emre) are printed in Turkey by the cemaat
publisher, Sürat Yayınları.
18 If the parents of a particular pupil are too poor to pay, the school management will meet the
costs. Sometimes a group of businessmen will become tutors of a group of children and pay
for their education.
19 Author’s interview with the assistant director of Turkish-Turkmen schools in Turkmenistan,
Ashgabat, November 1998.
20 This idea was probably inspired by Barkan, 1954.
21 The TDAV sends teachers to Central Asia, but far fewer than the cemaat because of its
shortage of economic resources. The TDAV has a stronger presence in Azerbaijan, where it
is easier to defend panturkist ideas. In Central Asia it is present in Kentau, Kzyl-Orda and
Atirau (Kazakhstan), Osh and Jalal-Abad (Kyrgyzstan). The TDAF is forbidden to
send teachers to Uzbekistan. Under the direction of Turan Yazgan, a famous panturkist
intellectual living in Turkey, the TDAF developed good relations with the Uzbek
opposition exiled in Turkey, and this made it difficult for it to work with the Uzbek
authorities. For more information about the TDAV, see www.tdav.com.tr.
22 There were good relations between Turkish teachers and American Peace Corps workers in
Naryn (Kyrgyzstan). These Turks and Americans were the only foreigners in this small city.
23 Author’s interviews with Uzbek journalists who worked at Zaman Ozbekiston when it was
being published in Uzbekistan.
24 The independence of the Central Asian States allowed the rebirth of some brotherhoods in
this region, especially in Uzbekistan. See Babadjanov, 1998.
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 169
25 These schools are called Turkish Schools; the names cemaat or Fethullah Gülen are never
mentioned. The Central Asian media have a good opinion of them. For Uzbekistan, see for
example Halk So’zi (11 February 1998), Ma’rifat (19 November 1997 and 1 August 1998),
Tafakkur (no. 3, 1998) et Halk Ta’limi (no. 1, 1998, pp. 36–37). For Turkmenistan, see for
example Nesil (13 June 1998), Turkmenistan (3 February 1998) and Mugallimlar Gazeti
(24 June 1998). All the media are controlled by the authorities in these countries, so if a
newspaper expresses satisfaction with something it can be assumed that the authorities are
satisfied too.
26 In order to prove its loyalty the educational and publishing company Silm Anonim S, irketi
(for example) translated some books by President Karimov and Abdullah Aripov, national
hero and poet, into the Turkish language. The best-known of these books are the president’s
Reformlar va Istikrar (Reforms and Stability) and Barkamal Avlod Arzusi (For a Perfect
Generation). This latter was translated into Turkish under the title Ideal Nesil Arzusu (For
the Best Generation).
27 For a complete list of Turkish politicians who have confidence in Fethullah Gülen, see
Kozadan, 1999, pp. 154–77. See also Armag˘an and Ünal, 1999, cited in the Bibliography
below, Section E(2)(a).
References
Aras, B. (1998) ‘Turkish Islam’s moderate face’, Middle East Quarterly, 5, 3,
pp. 23–29.
Babadjanov, B. (1998) ‘Le renouveau des communautés soufies en Ouzbékistan’, Les Cahiers
d’Asie centrale, 5–6, pp. 285–311.
Bal, I. (1997) ‘Orta Asya ve Batının Dıs, Politika Olarak Türk Modeli’ (‘The Turkish model
viewed by Central Asia and the West’), Yeni Türkiye, 15, pp. 936–45.
Balcı, A., Akkok, F. and Demir Engin, C. (2000) ‘The role of Turkish schools in the educational
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Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan’, Central Asian Survey, 19, 1, pp. 141–56.
Balcı, B. (1999) ‘Du mausolée à l’université: l’université turco-kazakhe Ahmet Yesevi au
centre de la coopération universitaire entre la Turquie et le Kazakhstan’, Cahiers d’études
du monde turco-iranien, 27.
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Bennigsen, A. and Wimbush, E. (eds) (1986) Muslims of the Soviet Union. A Guide
(Bloomington).
Can, E. (1996) Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile ufuk turu (A General Discussion with Fethullah
Gülen) (Istanbul, A.D Yayıncılık).
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pp. 13-40.
Erdog˘an, L. (1997) Küçük Dünyam Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile sohbet, 41. baskı (An
Interview with Fethullah Gülen) (Istanbul, A.D. Yayıncılık).
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Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, supérieur général de la compagnie de Jésus (Montréal,
Médiaspaul).
Gross, J-A. (1998) ‘Islamic Central Asia: approaches to religiosity and community’, Religious
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Gülen, F. (1994) Yitirilmis, Cennete Dog˘ru (Towards the Lost Paradise) (Izmir, TÖV).
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Türkiye, 15, pp. 685–92.
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pp. 133–38.
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170 Bayram Balcı
the Turkish Model) (Tashkent, Adolat), 94 pp.
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3rd edn (Ankara, Diyanet Is,leri Bas,kanlıg˘ı), 415 pp.
Kozadan (1999) Kozadan Kelebeg˘e (From Silk Cocoon to Butterfly) (Istanbul, Türkiye
Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı).
Mardin, S, . (1989) Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman
Said Nursi (New York, State University of New York Press).
Mursel, S. (1991) Siyasi Düs,ünce Tarihi Is,ıg˘ında Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Said Nursi in the
History of Political Thought) (Istanbul, Yeni Asya Yayınları).
Nursi, S. (1999) Risale-i-Nur (Epistle of the Light), 2 vols (Istanbul, Yeni Asya Yayınları (new
edition)); www.nesil.com.tr.
Schwarz, K. (1991) What You Can do for Your Country: An Oral History of the Peace Corps
(New York, Morrow), 316 pp.
Sevindi, N. (1997) Fethullah Gülen, New York Sohbeti (Discussions in New York with
Fethullah Gülen) (Istanbul, Sabah Yayınları).
Soylemez, M. (1997) Problem ve çözümleriyle eg˘itimimiz (Problems and Solutions for our
Education System) (Izmir: Çag˘layan yayınları).
Yavuz, H. (1999a) ‘Search for a new social contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gülen, the virtue
party and the Kurds’, SAIS Review, 19, 1, pp. 114–43.
Yavuz, H. (1999b) ‘Said Nursi and the Turkish experience’, The Muslim World, 89, 3–4.
Yavuz, H. (1999c) ‘Towards an Islamic liberalism? The Nurcu movement and Fethullah
Gülen’, Middle East Journal, 53, 4, pp. 584–605.
Bibliography on Central Asia, Turkey and the Nurcu Movement
(A) Theory and General Studies
(1) Political Science, International Relations and Sociology of Religion:
Allemand, S. (2000) ‘Les réseaux: nouveau regard, nouveaux modèles’, Sciences humaines,
104 (April), pp. 22–23.
Badie, B. (1995) ‘Réseaux transnationaux et instabilité mondiale’, Relations internationales et
stratégiques, 20, pp. 35–43.
Benhabib, S. (1997) Habermas and the Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on the Discourse
of Modernity (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).
Birnbaum, P. (1991) Sur l’individualisme: théories et methodes (Paris, FNSP).
Colonomos, A (ed.) (1995) Sociologie des réseaux transnationaux; communautés, entreprises
et individus: lien social et système international (Paris, L’Harmattan).
Diamond, L. (ed.) (1993) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder,
Colorado).
Diamond, L. (1996) Civil Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press).
Diamond, L. (1994) ‘The global imperative building a democratic world center’, Current
History (January), pp. 1–7.
Diamond, L. (1999) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies
(Boulder, Colo-Rienner).
Durkheim, É. (1985) Éducation et sociologie (Paris, PUF).
Freund, J. (1969) Max Weber (Paris, PUF).
Gauchet, M. (1999) Le désenchantement du monde, une histoire politique de la religion (Paris,
Gallimard).
Keohane, R. (1998) ‘Power and interdependence in the information age’, Foreign Affairs, 77,
5, pp. 81–94.
Leveau, R. (1995) ‘Influences extérieures et identités au Maghreb: le jeu du transnational’, in P.
Le Galles and M. Hatcher (eds) (1995) Les réseaux de politique publique; débat autour des
policy networks (Paris, L’Harmattan).
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 171
Percheron, A. (1993) La socialisation politique (Paris, Armand Colin).
Rosenau, J. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).
(2) Religious and Missionary Movements, Sects, Education:
Cobbs Hoffman, E. (1998) All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
Déloye, Y. (1994) École et citoyenneté, l’individualisme républicain de Jules Ferry à Vichy
(Paris, Éditions de la FNSP).
Giacomelli, R. (1991) Vous avez dit Jésuites ? Radioscopie d’une compagnie, dialogue avec
Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, supérieur général de la compagnie de Jésus (Montréal,
Médiaspaul).
Lacouture, J. (1991) Les Jésuites, une multibiographie, vol. 2, Les revenants (Paris, Seuil).
Neils, P. (1990) United States Attitudes and Policies toward China: The Impact of American
Missionaries (New York, Sharpe).
Petricoli, M. (1997) ‘Italian schools in Egypt’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 24, 2,
pp. 179–91.
Piccola, A. (1987) Missionnaires en Afrique (1840–1940), l’aventure coloniale de la France
(Paris, Denoël).
Schlegel, J-L. (1999) ‘Les sectes à l’âge démocratique’, Études, 3916, pp. 597–610.
Salt, J. (1992) Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896 (London,
Frank Cass).
(B) Central Asia
(1) General Studies:
Allworth, E. (1995) ‘Central Asia in the 1990’s. An annotated bibliography of books and
pamphlets published in English during the present decade by journalists, politicians,
scholars, students, travelers and others’, Central Asia Monitor, 5, pp. 15–30.
Atabaki, T. and O’Kane, J. (eds) (1998) Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, IIAS).
Bennigsen, A. and Lemercier-Quelquejay, C. (eds) (1964) La Presse et le mouvement national
chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920 (Paris, Mouton).
Bremmer, I. and Taras, R. (eds) (1997) New States: Building the Post-Soviet Nations
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Djalili, M-R. (1997) ‘La découverte de l’Asie centrale par la communauté internationale, du
discours aux réalités’, Notes et études documentaires, 5062–63, pp. 55–91.
Hayit, B. (1988) ‘Türkistan Terimi Üzerine’, Türk Dünyası Aras,tırmaları, 53, pp. 22–34.
Hiro, D. (1994) Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia (London,
Harper Collins).
Karimov, B. (1993) Millat Ravnaqi va Til Muammolari (Tashkent, Fan Nashriyoti).
Olcott, M. (1996) ‘Bouleversements démographiques en Asie centrale’, Stratégie, 63,
pp. 95–123.
(2) History:
Akiner, S. (1994) Formation of the Kazakh Identity (London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs).
Allworth, E. (1990) The Modern Uzbeks. From the Fourteenth Century to the Present. A
Cultural History (Stanford, CA, Hoover Press).
Dudoignon, S. (1996) ‘Djadidisme, mirasisme, islamisme’, Cahiers du monde russe, 37, 1–2,
pp. 13–40.
Kriendler, I. (1982) ‘Non-Russian education in Central Asia, an annotated biblioghraphy’,
Central Asian Survey, 2, 3.
Lipovsky, I. (1996) ‘Central Asia: in search of a new political identity’, Middle East Journal,
50, 2, pp. 211–23.
172 Bayram Balcı
Olcott, M-B. (1987) The Kazakhs (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press).
Platt, N. and Undeland, C. (eds) (1994) Central Asian Republics, Fragments of Empire,
Magnets of Wealth (New York, The Asia Society).
Roy, O. (1997) La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des nations (Paris, Éditions du
Seuil).
Ruffin, H. and Deuschler, A. (1999) The Post-Soviet Handbook, A Guide to Grassroots
Organizations and Internet Resources (Seattle, WA, Center for Civil Society International).
Sellier, J. and Sellier, A. (1993), Atlas des peuples de l’orient: Moyen-Orient, Caucase, Asie
centrale (Paris, La Découverte).
(3) Islam in Central Asia:
Akcali, P. (1998) ‘Islam as a common bond in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the
Afghan Mujahidin’, Central Asian Survey, 17, 2, pp. 267–84.
Akiner, S. (1996) ‘L’Asie centrale post-soviétique, le facteur islamique’, Les Cahiers de
l’Orient, 41, pp. 47–69.
Babadjanov, B. (1998) ‘Le renouveau des communautés soufies en Ouzbékistan’, Les Cahiers
d’Asie centrale, 5-6, pp. 285–311.
Bennigsen, A. and Wimbush, E. (eds) (1986) Muslims of the Soviet Union. A Guide
(Bloomington).
Dudoignon, S. and Georgeon, F. (eds) (1996) ‘Le réformisme musulman en Asie centrale’,
Cahiers du monde russe, 37.
Fathi, H. (1997) ‘Otines: The unknown women clerics of Central Asian Islam’, Central Asian
Survey, 16, 1, pp. 27–43.
Gross, J-A. (1998) ‘Islamic Central Asia: approaches to religiosity and community’, Religious
Studies Review, 24, 4, pp. 351–58.
Halbwach, U. (1996) ‘Islam in the CIS: a “rebirth”’, Aussenpolitik, 11, pp. 146–55.
Roy, O. (1993) ‘Sociétés Musulmanes et régimes néo-soviétiques’, Les Cahiers de l’Orient, 30,
pp. 123–29.
Schubel, J. (1999) ‘Post-Soviet hagiography and the reconstruction of the Naqshibandi tradition
in contemporary Uzbekistan’, in E. Özdalga (1999) Naqshibandis in Western and Central
Asia (Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute), pp. 73–87.
Zarcone, T. (2000) ‘Ahmad Yasavi, héros des nouvelles républiques centrasiatiques’, Revue du
monde musulman et de la méditerranée, série histoire, 89/90, pp. 297–322.
(4) Politics and International Affairs:
Anderson, J. (1995) ‘Authoritarian political development in Central Asia: the case of
Turkmenistan’, Central Asian Survey, 14, 4, pp. 509–27.
Dudoignon, S. (1994) ‘Le renouveau politique en Asie centrale’, Nouveaux Mondes, 4.
Fierman, W. (1989) ‘“Glasnost” in practice: The Uzbek experience’, Central Asian Survey, 8,
2, pp. 1–45.
Hyman, A. (1997) ‘Turkestan and panturkism revisited’, Central Asian Survey, 16, 3,
pp. 339–51.
Kaiser, R. (1992) ‘Nations and homelands in Soviet Central Asia’, in R. Lewis (1992)
Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (London/New York), pp. 279–312.
Roy, O. (1995) ‘L’Asie centrale entre soviétisme et nationalisme’, Esprit, 5, pp. 55–68.
Sjoberg, A. (1993) ‘Language structure and cultural identity: a historical perspective on the
Turkic peoples of Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey, 12, 4, pp. 557–64.
(C) Turkey
(1) Islam and Secularism:
Barkan, Ö. (1954) Kolonizatör Türk Dervis,leri (Istanbul).
Berkes, N. (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964).
Çakir, R. (1994) Ne S,eriat ne Demokrasi, Refah Partisini Anlamak (Istanbul, Metis Yayınları).
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 173
Dumont, P. (1986) ‘Disciples of the light. The Nurju movement in Turkey’, Central Asian
Survey, 5, 2, pp. 33–60.
Gole, N. (1997) ‘Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites’
Middle East Journal, 51, 1, pp. 46–77.
Helvacıog˘lu, B. (1996) ‘Allahu Ekber, we are Turks: yearning for a different homecoming at
the periphery of Europe’, Third World Quarterly, 17, 3, pp. 503–23.
Heper, M. (1997) ‘Islam and democracy in Turkey: toward a reconciliation’, The Middle East
Journal, 51, 1, pp. 32–45.
Özdalga, E. (ed.) (1999) Naqshibendis in Western and Central Asia (Istanbul, Swedish
Research Institute).
(2) Foreign Policy:
Çalıs,, S,. (1997) ‘Pan-Turkism and Europeanism: a note on Turkey’s “pro-German neutrality”
during the Second World War’, Central Asian Survey, 16, pp. 103–14.
Copeaux, E. (2000) Une vision turque du monde à travers les cartes: de 1931 à nos jours
(Paris, CNRS).
Fuller, G. and Lesser, I. (1993) Turkey’s New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China
(Boulder, CO, Westview).
Toumarkine, A. (1996) ‘Ambitions nationales et désenclavement régional: les politiques turque
et iranienne en Transcaucasie’, Notes et études documentaires, 15, pp. 55–65.
Williams, A. and Balkır C. (1993) Turkey and Europe (London, Pinter).
(D) Turkey and Central Asia
(1) General Studies:
Aydemir, S,. (1972) Makedonyadan Orta Asya’ya Enver Pas,a (Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi).
Aydın, M. (1996) ‘Turkey and Central Asia: challenges of change’, Central Asian Survey, 15,
2, pp. 157–77.
Bezanis, L. (1994) ‘Soviet Muslim émigrés in the Republic of Turkey’, Central Asian Survey,
13, 1, pp. 59–180.
Copeaux, E. (1992) ‘Les Turcs de l’extérieur dans Türkiye: un aspect du discours nationaliste
turc’, CÉMOTI, 14, pp. 31–52.
Makovsky, A. (1999) ‘The new activism in the Turkish foreign policy’, SAIS Review, 19, 1,
pp. 92–113.
Svanberg, I. (1989), ‘Kazakh refugees in Turkey. A study of cultural persistence and social
change’, Studia Multiethnica Upsaliensia, 8.
(2) Linguistic and Educational Cooperation:
Balcı, B. (1999) ‘Ahmet Yesevi, du mausolée à l’université’, Cahiers d’études du monde turcoiranien,
27, pp. 313–28.
Bican Ercilasun, A. (1997) Örneklerle Bugünkü Türk Alfabeleri (Ankara, Kültür Bakanlıg˘ı).
Bilici, F. (1992) ‘Acteurs de développement des relations entre la Turquie et le monde turc: les
vakıf’, CÉMOTI, 14, pp. 16–29.
De Tapia, S. (1995) ‘Türksat et les républiques turcophones de l’ex-URSS’, CÉMOTI, 20,
pp. 399–413.
Ersanlı, B. (1995) Türk Cumhuriyetleri Kültür Profili Aras,tırması (Ankara, Kültür Bakanıg˘ı,
Bas,vuru kitapları).
Faullimel, M. (1994) Proximité culturelle et amitié entre états : les états turc et ouzbek et l’aire
turcophone (Mémoire présenté pour le Diplôme d’Études Approfondies, Institut d’Études
Politiques de Paris).
Hazai, G. (1993) ‘La question linguistique dans le monde turc actuel’, CÉMOTI, 14,
pp. 5–29.
Milli Eg˘itim Bakanlıg˘ı (1998) Cumhuriyetin 75’inci Yıl Dönümünde Türk Cumhuriyetleri Türk
ve Akraba Toplulukları ile Eg˘itim Ilis,kilerimiz (Ankara, Milli Eg˘itim Bakanlıg˘ı).
Muhiddin, T. (1994) ‘Les relations culturelles de la Turquie avec les républiques turcophones’,
174 Bayram Balcı
Anka, Revue d’art et de littérature de Turquie, 22/23, pp. 113–21.
Sag˘lam, M. (1997) ‘Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Eg˘itim Ilis,kilerimiz’, Yeni Türkiye, 14,
pp. 683–84.
(E) The Nurcu Movement
(1) Said Nursi and his Movement:
(a) Hagiographies.
Abdulhamid, M. (1995) Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Risale-i Nur (Istanbul, Yeni Asya
Nes,riyatı).
Dogen, S,. (1996) Söz Bediüzzamanın (Istanbul, Gençlik Yayınları).
Ertug˘rul, H. (1996) Eg˘itimde Bediüzzaman modeli (Istanbul, Yeni Asya Yayınları).
Karabas,og˘lu, M. (1998) Risale okumaları (Istanbul, Zafer Yayınları).
Mutlu, I. (1994) Bediüzzaman Görüs,leri ıs,ıg˘ında Parti ve Siyaset (Istanbul, Mutlu Yayıncılık).
Mutlu, I. (1995) Sorularla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 2.Cilt (Istanbul, Mutlu Yayıncılık).
Salihi, I-K. (1993) Islâm Önderlerinden Bediüzzamn Said Nursi ve Eseri (Izmir, Is, ık
Yayınları).
Soylemez, M. (1997) Problem ve çözümleriyle eg˘itimimiz (Izmir, Çag˘layan yayınları).
Yas,ar, S. (1994) Bediüzzaman Kimdir? Sosyolojik Biyografi (Istanbul, Gençlik Yayınları).
(b) Scientific Analyses.
Mardin, S,. (1989) Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediüzzaman
Said Nursi (New York, State University of New York Press).
Mursel, S. (1991) Siyasi Düs,ünce Tarihi Is,ıg˘ında Bediüzzaman Saïd Nursi (Istanbul, Yeni Asya
Yayınları).
Ongun, H. (1997) ‘Bas,langıçtan Günümüze Said Nursi ve Nurculuk Hareketi’, Yeni Türkiye,
45, pp. 57–71.
Yavuz, H. (1999b) ‘Said Nursi and the Turkish Experience’, The Muslim World, 89, 3–4.
(2) Fethullah Gülen and his Community:
(a) Hagiographies.
Armag˘an, M. and Ünal, A. (1999) Medya Aynasinda Fethullah Gülen, Kozadan Kelebeg˘e
(Istanbul, Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı).
Ayduz, D. and Erdog˘an, L. (1998) Iki Çarpıtma Örneg˘i (Istanbul, Merkür Yayınları).
Camlı, S. and Ünal, K. (1999) Fethullah Gülenin Konus,ma ve Yazilarinda Hos,görü ve Diyalog
Iklimi (Izmir, Merkür Yayıncılık).
Can, E. (1996) Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile ufuk turu (Istanbul, A.D. Yayıncılık).
Erdog˘an, L. (1997) Küçük Dünyam Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile sohbet, 41. baskı (Istanbul,
A.D. Yayıncılık).
Sevindi, N. (1997) Fethullah Gülen, New York Sohbeti (Istanbul, Sabah Yayınları).
(b) Scientific Analyses.
Bulut, F. (1998) Kim Bu Fethullah Gülen, Dünü, Bugünü (Istanbul, Ozan Yayıncılık).
Çalıs,lar, O. (1997) Fethullah Güle’nden Cemalettin Kaplan’a, Islamiyet üzerine Söyles,iler
(Istanbul, Pencere Yayınları).
Isinbark, A. and Tahirog˘lu, G. (1996) ‘Fethullah Gülen et ses finances’, Aktüel Para, 114.
Kozanog˘lu, C. (1997) ‘Türkiye Liderini Arıyor, Fethullah Gülen Cemaat i Geliyor, Devtetçi,
projeci yeni çag˘ bilgesi’, Birikim, 93/94, pp. 38–51.
Kozanog˘lu, C. (1997) Internet, Dolunay, Cemaat (Istanbul, Iletis,im Yayınları).
Laçıner, Ö. (1995) ‘Seçkinci bir geleneg˘in temsilcisi olarak Fethullah Hoca’, Birikim, 77,
pp. 3–10.
Özdalga, E. (1999) Worldly Ascetism in New Cast: Effects of Fethullah Gülen Inspired Piety
and Entrepreneurship in Late Twentieth Century Turkey (Istanbul, Swedish Research
Institute).
Özyurek, E. (1997) ‘Feeling tells better than language: emotional expression and gender
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 175
hierarchy in the sermons of Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi’, New Perspectives on Turkey, vol.
16, pp. 41–51.
Yavuz, H. (1999a) ‘Search for a new social contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gülen, the virtue
party and the Kurds’, SAIS Review, 19, 1, pp. 114–43.
(3) The Nurcu Schools in Central Asia:
Ayvazog˘lu, B. (1996) ‘Ata Yurduna Vefa Borcu’ Aksiyon, 9–15 November, pp. 24–39.
Balcı, B. (2002) ‘Fethullah Gülen’s missionary schools’, ISIM Newsletter, 9.
Balcı, A., Akkok, F. and Demir Engin, C. (2000) ‘The role of Turkish schools in the educational
system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: the case of
Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan’, Central Asian Survey, 19, 1, pp. 141–56.
Appendix 1. List of Nurcu high schools in each Central Asian State
These statistics were obtained from the General Directorate (Genel Müdürlük) of the high
schools in each republic. They relate to the 1996–97 academic year. The number of schools and
students is liable to change every year, depending on levels of recruitment and on internal reorganisation
by the schools’ directors. There are three Nurcu universities in Central Asia
(Ashgabat, Almaty and Bishkek).
Table 1. Kyrgyzstan
Locality Gender Name of Main Opened Number of Number of
company subjects in pupils teachers
Bishkek Male Sebat General 1992/93 249 35
Aichurok Female Sebat General 1993/94 168 26
Issyk-Kul Male Sebat General 1992/93 262 28
Naryn Male Sebat General 1993/94 181 24
Osh-Sema Male Sebat General 1992/93 302 32
Osh Male Sebat Technology 1993/94 174 27
Tokmak Male Sebat Business 1993/94 130 22
Kademjai Male Sebat Oriental 1993/94 187 25
Studies
Kizil-Kiya Male Sebat Business 1994/95 129 23
Jalal-Abad Female Sebat General 1995/96 78 18
Jalal-Abad Male Sebat General 1993/94 233 31
Bishkek Mixed Université General 1996/97 ? 32
Ala Taou
Total 2093 323
Table 2. Kazakhstan
Locality Gender Name of Main Opened Number of Number of
company subjects in pupils teachers
Almaty–Tolgar Male Feza General 1993/94 157 18
Almaty Female Feza General 1993/94 246 25
Aksai Male Feza General 1994/95 290 30
Almaty Male Feza Oriental 1994/95 230 26
Studies
Jambul Female Feza General 1994/95 100 11
176 Bayram Balcı
Turkestan-Kentau Male Feza General 1992/93 194 15
Almaty Male S, elale Physics 1992/93 120 13
Kzyl-Orda Male Feza Physics 1993/94 256 24
Kzyl-Orda Female Feza General 1994/95 143 16
Akmola (Astana) Male Feza Physics 1994/95 134 15
Aktobe Male Feza General 1993/94 263 26
Arkalyk Male Feza Physics 1993/94 166 15
Atyrau Male S, elale Physics 1993/94 206 22
Chimkent Male S, elale Physics 1993/94 333 29
Chimkent Male S, elale Oriental 1993/94 122 13
Studies
Chimkent Female S, elale General 1993/94 150 16
Kokchetav Male S, elale General 1992/93 235 26
Jambul Male S, elale General 1993/94 263 28
Jezkazgan Male S, elale General 1993/94 230 22
Karaganda Male S, elale General 1993/94 250 24
Kustanai Male S, elale General 1994/95 133 15
Ust-Kamenogorsk Male S, elale General 1993/94 189 21
Pavlodar Male S, elale General 1994/95 169 19
Semei Male S, elale General 1994/95 190 21
Taldy-Kurgan Male S, elale General 1993/94 243 23
Jambul Male S, elale Economics 1993/94 210 23
Taldy-Kurgan Male Eflak Technology 1993/94 312 30
Almaty Mixed Eflak University 1996/97 150 14
Total 5684 580
Table 3. Turkmenistan
Locality Gender Name of Main Opened Number of Number of
company subjects in pupils teachers
Ashgabat Mixed Bas,kent University, 1994/95 419 43
general
Ashgabat Male Bas,kent General 1992/93 378 40
Tashauz Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 192 21
Kerki Male Bas,kent General 1994/95 147 17
Charjou Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 226 27
Buzmein Male Bas,kent General 1994/95 138 19
Tejen Male Bas,kent General 1994/95 149 18
Mary Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 248 28
Bairam-Ali Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 231 23
Kunya-Urgench Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 187 20
Nebit-Dag Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 181 26
Turkmenbashi Male Bas,kent General 1993/94 134 20
Ashgabat Female Bas,kent General 1994/95 187 19
Ashgabat Male Bas,kent Technology 1994/95 150 25
Ashgabat Mixed Bas,kent Foreign 1994/95 327 7
Languages
and
Computing
Total 3294 353
Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools 177
Table 4. Uzbekistan
Locality Gender Name of Main Opened Number of Number of
company subjects in pupils teachers
Tashkent Male Silm General 1992/93 243 15
Kibrai-Tashkent Male Silm General 1993/94 185 11
Tashkent Female Silm General 1993/94 148 9
Tashkent Male Silm Economics 1993/94 214 14
Tashkent Male Silm Computing 1993/94 154 14
Nukus Male Silm General 1992/93 180 12
Fergana Male Silm General 1992/93 203 12
Andijan Male Silm General 1993/94 166 11
Angren Male Silm General 1993/94 155 11
Samarkand Male Silm General 1992/93 198 12
Namangan Male Silm General 1992/93 232 14
Bukhara Male Silm General 1992/93 225 12
Urgench (Khorezm) Male Silm General 1992/93 205 12
Kokand Male Silm General 1993/94 215 16
Jizak Male Silm General 1993/94 187 11
Termez Male Silm General 1993/94 144 10
Tashkent Ulugbek
International
School Mixed Silm Business and 1995/96 120 12
Management
Tashkent Mixed Silm Languages 1993/94 160 2
Total 3334 210
Appendix 2. Coordination of the Nurcu schools in Central Asia in 1996–97
Nurcu
Businessmen’s
Associations
Nurcu
Businessmen’s
Associations
Nurcu
Businessmen’s
Associations
Nurcu
Businessmen’s
Associations